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Managing Parents: Navigating Parental Rights in
Juvenile Cases
MARGARETH ETIENNE
In criminal and delinquency proceedings against juveniles, who determines
how much or how little a child’s parents participate in the case? This has much to
do with the parental inclinations, of course, but the legal answer regarding the
parental authority to participate resides in two distinct but related areas of law.
Part of the answer to this question comes from In re Gault, in which the Supreme
Court held that minors in delinquency proceedings are guaranteed certain
constitutional safeguards. This means, for instance, that children have the right to
counsel. It also implies—as most scholars have since argued—that children have
the right to expect their lawyers to act as their agents and to follow their directions
without regard to parental directives. Another part of the answer comes from a line
of cases starting with Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which
held that parents have broad constitutional rights to raise and make decisions
regarding their children. Whatever the doctrinal merits of these two separate
threads of case law, they fail to provide a coherent vision of parental involvement
or the rights of parents in the juvenile justice process.
Gault’s failure to account for the then well-established line of cases of Meyer
and Pierce, has led to a juvenile court system in which parents have no decisionmaking authority over the juvenile delinquency process. Yet, the reality is that
parents do participate in the juvenile court process. In this Article, I consider the
parental role that parents and guardians play in their children’s legal cases and ask
whether the exclusion of parents from decision making is doctrinally and
normatively sound. In considering the doctrinal question, I compare the parental
role in other legal contexts and examine the applicability of the rules that courts
employ to determine parental exclusion. In assessing the normative question, I
weigh the existing research on the impact of parental involvement, when it occurs,
to determine if parental participation yields results that are in the minor’s best
interest.
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Managing Parents: Navigating Parental Rights in
Juvenile Cases
MARGARETH ETIENNE *
INTRODUCTION
Ted, a teenager, is a good kid who has joined up with a bad
crowd. His worried parents don’t know exactly what he is up
to, but one day they get a call from the police that he’s been
arrested for drugs. They write a letter to the court and their
son’s lawyer begging that he be “sentenced” to a juvenile
facility where he can get drug treatment—something they
can’t afford.
Tara, a teenager, is a good kid. She is facing aggravated battery
charges for causing serious bodily injury to another child
during a cafeteria riot started by other students. The charge
usually involves a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years,
but the prosecutor has offered a twelve-month sentence. Tara
is inclined to take the offer but her parents are adamant that
their daughter not have a violent felony on her record or spend
any time in custody.
For lawyers and legal scholars, these scenarios raise complex legal
questions. But for the lay person, these scenarios represent extraordinarily
difficult parenting decisions. Yet the law doesn’t recognize them as such.
They are not considered under the rubric of cases that concern the
parents’ constitutional rights to protect or to raise their children, but rather
under the rubric of cases that address a minor’s constitutional rights in a
quasi-criminal context to make her own decisions regarding her case. Simply
put, this Article considers why this is the case, and asks whether this
approach is sound. In this Article, I consider the parental role that parents
and guardians play in their children’s legal cases and ask whether the
exclusion of parents from decision-making is doctrinally and normatively
sound. In considering the doctrinal question, I compare the parental role in
other legal contexts and examine the applicability of the rules that courts
employ to determine parental exclusion. In assessing the normative question,
*
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I weigh the existing research on the impact of parental involvement, when it
occurs, to determine if parental participation yields results that are in the
minor’s best interest.
This Article takes us back to the legal and historical juncture during
which juvenile adjudication cases were neither clearly “quasi-criminal” nor
clearly family law. It identifies In re Gault1 and its treatment of juvenile
delinquency as a criminal case as an important point in that juncture.
Without calling for a complete reversal, this Article engages in a
reimagining of the juvenile court process with a more robust account of the
parental role. It also examines opportunities lost and the traps avoided under
the current construct. It proceeds in four parts beyond the Introduction. Part
I considers the two lines of cases preceding In re Gault and the modern-day
understanding of the juvenile court. It identifies Gault as an important
juncture in the diminution of parental rights.
Part II provides a brief summary of the strength of the parents’
constitutional claim to raise and direct the affairs of their children. I contrast
this against the sometimes-competing claims of minors to direct their own
affairs, particularly when their constitutional rights are implicated. I
consider how the parental role in juvenile cases is analyzed differently from
the parental role in other legal realms. Typically, cases involving the parent,
child, and state follow a pattern—a triad of rights and liberties and
privileges—that is not found in juvenile cases. I show that this is, at least in
part, because the juvenile is treated like an adult and provided with a lawyer
who facilitates the child’s actions in ways normally reserved to the parent. I
conclude that decision making in juvenile court cases is an anomaly
doctrinally, not only because parents are excluded, but because of the
manner in which their exclusion takes place.
Part III assesses the potential impact of parental inclusion and exclusion
in juvenile cases more directly. I explore the impact of parental involvement
in the context of two contemporary legal developments—one that is parentincluding and one that is parent-excluding. The parent-including policy is
the right of juveniles in some jurisdictions to include parents in the
interrogation room. Underpinning this policy is the recognition that
juveniles are vulnerable and in need of protection and guidance. I examine
a practice that exemplifies parental exclusion—the continued refusal of
courts and legislatures to extend the attorney-client privilege to
conversations between the child, parent, and attorney. I consider how minors
fare under these developments and what they reveal about the exclusion of
parents generally.
In Part V, I conclude by discussing the implications for juvenile justice,
parental rights, and the legal profession.

1

387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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IN RE GAULT AND ITS PREDECESSORS: TWO LINES OF CASES

Sometimes one must look a gift horse in the mouth. This is true in life
and also true in law. For thousands of children and their families, the case of
In re Gault was such a gift horse. In 1967, when Gault was decided, juveniles
had few articulated due process rights when confronted with delinquency
charges. Gerald Gault’s case provided an excellent example of the
unregulated procedures in such cases and the often-unjust results they
yielded.
The facts of Gault are well-known among students and practitioners of
juvenile law. Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault and his friend Ronald Lewis
were arrested for making a prank phone call to one Mrs. Cook, a neighbor.2
Upon receiving the call, during which the caller or callers made lewd
remarks of the “irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety[,]” Mrs. Cook
called the police.3 Gerald was arrested at home at around 10 a.m. 4 When his
mother arrived home from work to an empty home, she sent his older brother
to search for him.5 Gerald’s brother learned from friends that Gerald had
been taken to the Children’s Detention Home and was scheduled for a
juvenile court hearing the following day.6 That hearing, and each subsequent
hearing, was held without formal notice to Gerald or to his parents.7 Gerald
was not represented by counsel, as the common understanding of juvenile
proceedings at the time was that they were “nonadversarial” conferences
with a family law judge who sought to determine the result that was in the
best interest of the child.8 Mrs. Cook, the victim and the complaining
witness, never testified at any of the hearings and therefore Gerald had no
opportunity to confront her or her statements.9 This would have been
especially important in a case where the nature and tone of the statements—
as well as the identity of the caller—were critical factors (there was some
dispute as to whether the caller was Gerald Gault or his friend Ron Lewis).10
Almost none of the procedural safeguards to which Gerald would have been
entitled in adult criminal court were made available to him.
Gerald would have been better off had he been charged in adult criminal
court. Indeed, had an adult been charged with the same offense, he or she
would have been sentenced to a maximum of a $50 fine and 60 days in jail.11
2

Id. at 4.
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 5.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See id. at 78 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing the type of non-adversarial juvenile
proceedings that were at issue in Gault).
9
Id. at 5–6.
10
Id. at 6.
11
Id. at 29.
3
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Gerald Gault’s judge, following a series of informal hearings, sentenced him
to a maximum of six years in juvenile detention.12 To add insult to injury,
Gerald Gault had no statutory right to appeal his sentence or the manner in
which it was determined.13
In a last resort habeas petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
soundly rejected the juvenile court’s proceedings, declaring them to be in
violation of Gault’s constitutional rights.14 For Gerald Gault and juveniles
like him, this was a gift horse. There was no precedent clear enough to make
this result a forgone conclusion.15 There were at least two lines of cases from
which the Court could have drawn, as delinquency cases sit at the
intersection of family law and criminal law.
In the context of family law, the Supreme Court had developed a
parental rights jurisprudence most notably with cases such as Meyer v.
Nebraska16 in 1923 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters17 in 1925. By the mid1900s, it was well established that parents had constitutional liberty interests
in raising and making decisions on behalf of their children. The juvenile
court was initially seen as an extension of the family function, with all the
informality that such an extension of that role would suggest. The juvenile
court was not viewed as merely a mini-version of the criminal court. That
said, by the 1960s, the Supreme Court’s criminal law jurisprudence was
rapidly transforming under the Warren Court. It quickly bore some influence
in juvenile law. The Court’s decision in United States v. Kent,18 decided in
1966 just shortly before Gault, revealed the Court’s willingness to apply
criminal procedural reforms to juvenile cases. While Kent paved the way,
Gault, in many ways, is the case that catapulted juvenile law into the
criminal law arena. The Court’s reasoning and resolution in Gault leads us
today to view juvenile matters questions more as criminal rights questions
than as children’s rights questions.
A. Delinquency Cases and Procedural Due Process Rights
In re Gault fundamentally changed the landscape of the juvenile
delinquency process. It is consistently recognized as the high point of
children’s rights because it opened the door to the possibility that the
expansion of liberty rights recognized in adult criminal proceedings under
the Warren Court would extend to the quasi-criminal context of juvenile
12

Id.
Id. at 8.
14
Id. at 59.
15
Both the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona Supreme Court dismissed Gault’s petition on
the merits before it was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 3–4.
16
262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923).
17
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
18
383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
13
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delinquency adjudications. The Court in Gault declared that children have
procedural constitutional rights that parallel, in kind, if not degree, the rights
of adult criminal defendants.19 Without delineating the particulars of the
rights guaranteed to minors, the Supreme Court held that, generally, minors
are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
juvenile delinquency determinations.20 Although the Court stated that the
safeguards provided to adults in criminal court were highly contextual and
that the full array of constitutional rights might not apply wholesale to
minors, it nonetheless made plain that a delinquency “hearing must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”21 Justice Fortas,
writing for the Court, described the reform process mandated by Gault as
the “constitutional domestication” of the juvenile courts, implying in part
that the adult criminal courts had already been constitutionally domesticated.
The Supreme Court likely viewed the Gault decision as the natural
progression of what had been taking place in criminal courts and a natural
progression of procedural due process. Indeed, the constitutional
domestication of the adult criminal courts had a profound impact in setting
the stage for reforms in juvenile courts.22 In individual contests throughout
the country, juveniles were not always granted the same rights guaranteed to
adults, but the Warren Court decisions nonetheless shaped the landscape of
the debate. Juvenile courts began to consider minors’ claims regarding the
applicability of Miranda warnings,23 Brady discovery,24 jury trials,25 plea

19

Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
Id.
21
Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)).
22
See id. at 22 (“[T]he commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of juveniles
separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under discussion.”);
see also Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1187 (1970) (recognizing that the decision led to a complete reexamination of the juvenile justice system
and describing the emerging reforms as arguably the third great wave in the juvenile justice movement).
23
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504–05 (1966) (holding that law enforcement must cease
questioning when a criminal suspect requests an attorney); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727–28
(1979) (finding that a minor’s request for an adult other than an attorney does not require cessation of
questioning by law enforcement).
24
Compare Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a prosecution’s
failure to disclose favorable material evidence upon request of defendant), with K.C. v. State, 92 P.3d
805, 810 (Wyo. 2004) (applying Brady in a juvenile delinquency adjudication).
25
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury applied to the states). Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 529 (1971) (holding that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate jury trials in delinquency
petitions).
20
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27

procedures, and the standard of proof in juvenile courts, among other
things. There can be little doubt that Gault and its progeny are themselves
the products of the expansion of procedural constitutional rights for the
accused.
B. Delinquency Cases and Substantive Due Process Rights
But if we see Gault only as a variant of the constitutional criminal
procedures, we may be missing something important about what the
decision failed to do. Gault was also positioned to be the jurisprudential
inheritor of a different legal trend: the development of substantive due
process rights, particularly as applied to parents’ authority over their
children. In other words, the Gault Court could have achieved the same
result by arguing that the boy’s parents’ rights were violated by an
adjudication process that rendered it impossible for them to adequately
protect or make decisions for their child. The diminished and clearly
secondary role of parents in the juvenile justice process that was ratified in
Gault—and now largely taken for granted—was not preordained by
precedent. Gault’s parents, working-class parents who both worked outside
of the home in 1964,28 were wronged in the handling of his case. Their child
was forcibly removed from their home, with neither notice nor permission,
and confined for the remainder of his childhood. Gerald Gault’s parents
argued that these actions not only violated Gerald’s rights as the accused,
but that they violated their own due process rights as parents.29 Yet their
parental rights were given short shrift by the Supreme Court of Arizona in
its response that even absent formal notice, “Mrs. Gault knew the exact
nature of the charge.”30 While the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately found in
favor of Gerald Gault, it relied largely on the due process rights to which
juveniles are entitled and said vary little about the concomitant notice and
process rights of their parents. In other words, the Court treated the parental
rights as a collateral and secondary function of the accused juvenile’s rights.
This treatment was inconsistent with the generation of cases preceding
Gault and starting famously with Meyer v. Nebraska31 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters32 that give priority to parental rights over children’s rights, or at
26

Compare Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (requiring courts to assess whether a
defendant’s guilty plea is free and voluntary through plea colloquy), with In re E.F., 862 A.2d 239, 242
(Vt. 2004) (applying Boykin in a juvenile proceeding).
27
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (defining the standard of proof in criminal cases as
beyond a reasonable doubt and finding that it applied to the adjudicatory stage of the delinquency hearing,
but leaving the question undecided as to other phases in the juvenile process).
28
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 5 (1967).
29
Id. at 32.
30
Id.
31
262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923).
32
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
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the very least view the parental rights as a means to achieve the interests of
the child. In this line of cases, the Supreme Court recognized the substantive
due process rights of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of
children.33 The contemporary formulation is that parents have “a
constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the State,
how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child.”34 While Gault paid
homage to this idea by requiring soft rights for parents, such as notice of
charges and proceedings,35 it provided no robust analysis of what the
parent’s decision-making rights in the juvenile justice process ought to be.
Although the American Parents Committee filed an amicus brief in Gault, it
is not clear that the Court considered in any serious way the interplay
between procedural constitutional rights for children and substantive
constitutional rights for their parents.36 It may be that as a strategic matter,
the American Parents Committee did not want to dilute the appellants’ claim
for children’s rights by raising the specter of unmet parental entitlements.
Accordingly, the question of parental rights in Gault, and across the juvenile
justice process system generally, has received relatively little attention in the
legal literature. Gault did nothing to foreclose a more structured or
expansive parental role, but it declined to require it. In the absence of clear
guidance, the role played by parents in proceedings that can result in their
children being sent to prison varies dramatically by jurisdiction and, indeed,
by judge.
The Supreme Court left a void in the process by failing to account for
the minor’s need for parental guidance and assistance in making decisions.
The Supreme Court almost certainly anticipated that parents would have
some role in the juvenile justice process, but the Court failed to articulate a
vision—either positive or normative—of what that role might be. In this
Article, I undertake an examination of what greater parental involvement in
juvenile court might look like. I consider the juvenile delinquency process
through the lens of parental rights and the substantive due process cases that
33
See id. at 534–35 (explaining that the Constitution guarantees the “liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing . . . of children under their control”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (listing,
among other Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the right to “establish a home and bring up
children”).
34
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing this formulation
as a point of perhaps unanimous agreement among the justices notwithstanding their separate opinions).
35
Gault, 387 U.S. at 33–34.
36
The American Parents Committee filed an amicus brief on behalf of Appellant Gault but none of
the most prominent parental rights cases of the day were cited or discussed. As amicus, American Parents
Committee argued that the child, society, and presumably the family benefited from “the extension of
constitutional safeguards to the juvenile process.” Brief of The American Parents Committee as Amicus
Curiae, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 116), 1996 WL 100789, at *25. The sponsors of the brief did
not advance an argument in favor of greater parental decision-making rights in delinquency cases. Rather
than arguing that parents had special insights or interests in determining a court’s course of action, the
brief for amicus conceded that “often the parents themsel[ves] come with an admission of failure” before
the juvenile court. Id. at *21.
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articulate those liberty interests. To do this, I consider how parental
participation is managed and regulated in juvenile criminal and delinquency
cases. By leaving unanswered the question of whether any particular
standard or test should govern the nature and extent of parental involvement,
the Court left the issue open to be determined on an ad hoc basis. To answer
how that void is filled, I begin by examining how courts traditionally analyze
a competition of rights between the parent, child, and state for guidance on
how we might do so here. This examination reveals important differences
between other parent-child-state decision-making cases and the decision
making in the juvenile’s case.
II. THE ABERRANT CASE: PARENTAL RIGHTS IN JUVENILE CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY CASES
The juvenile case stands as an aberration to other parent-child decisionmaking cases in important ways. It is most commonly against the state that
the parent’s constitutional right to raise and direct the child is claimed and
exercised.37 That is to say, in case after case on parental rights, the state is
the parent’s primary competitor for decision-making authority over the
child.38 In the juvenile case, the parent who seeks to exercise her right to
make decisions on behalf of her child must interact with the child’s lawyer
if there is a disagreement. The involvement of the lawyer alters the parentchild relationship and its dynamic in important ways. Although most
juveniles are represented by public defenders or other state-appointed
counsel, the attorney does not act “as the state.” Indeed, the juvenile’s
attorney often opposes the state as it is embodied by the prosecutor or the
judge. To suggest otherwise grossly oversimplifies the lawyer’s role. 39 This
37

Of course, the child might also compete with parents for rights to make decisions over important
matters in their lives. See, e.g., Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and
the State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 35–36 (2004) (discussing justification for affording children rights
as related to children’s development of decision-making skills).
38
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925) (finding state requirement
compelling children to attend public school unconstitutional because parents have constitutional right to
choose their children’s schooling under Fourteenth Amendment); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649
(1972) (declaring Illinois statute presuming unfitness of unwed fathers “constitutionally repugnant” for
violation of protected parental rights); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972) (finding
unconstitutional strict application of compulsory education laws preventing Amish parents from
withdrawing their children from school two years early); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (holding that parents have constitutional right to decide on religious training and
practice).
39
It is well established that the public defender, which I take the appointed juvenile criminal
attorney to be, does not act “under the color of state law” when performing traditional criminal defense
functions. Polk v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981). As the Dodson Court further notes: “In our system
a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State. The system . . .
posits that a defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with
it, but rather by advancing ‘the undivided interests of his client.’” Id. at 318–19. The only difference
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is especially true in the quasi-criminal context of judicial proceedings.
Nonetheless, the characterization is fitting in important ways if we consider
the lawyer’s role as intermediary between parent and child. Still, the role of
the state qua state is difficult to discern. In every other legal context, a child
who opposes her parent’s constitutional authority does so only with the
state’s approval. In the context of juvenile criminal defendants, the lawyer
is more of a legal hired gun who facilitates the child’s wishes, whether they
oppose the state or the parent. And in the lawyer, the parent faces a
formidable potential adversary—a trained legal professional who is usually
a repeat player in the system. It is the lawyer who is complicit with the child
in potentially opposing the parent’s authority. The child can conspire in
secrecy (based on attorney-client confidentiality) with her state-sponsored
attorney to make important life-changing decisions (for instance, to accept a
plea deal or go to trial) with total disregard of her parents’ wishes.
Of course, not every attorney who represents children in this context is
employed by the state, but most are.40 And certainly the state sanctions the
system by which the child, aided by her lawyer, can circumvent the parent
and oppose her wishes. That said, the lawyer’s participation accentuates the
disempowerment of the parent in the juvenile law context but it doesn’t
create it.
The parental role in the juvenile justice case stands in stark contrast to
our constitutional and societal understanding of the parent’s role in other
areas of their children’s lives. It is well established that parents enjoy broad
constitutional rights in making decisions regarding the upbringing of their
minor children.41 A principal embodiment of these rights is the ability to
make decisions on behalf of their children without undue interference from
the state or third parties.42 This parental decision-making authority extends
to virtually all matters, including matters of the greatest importance to the
lives of their children such as education, religion, medical treatment,
between the private attorney and the appointed attorney, according to the Dodson Court, is the lawyer’s
source of payment. Id.
40
See JJGPS, JUVENILE DEFENSE (2017), http://www.jjgps.org/juvenile-defense (providing data
that, for the few states that do report such data, in 2001, 20% of juveniles had court appointed counsel,
72.3% were represented by a public defender, and 7.6% were represented by private attorneys).
41
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that the right to teach German
in schools to children at the request of their parents relates to the constitutional right recognized for
parents to educate their children); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the liberty of parents to direct their children’s education); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) (holding that the right to make parental decisions is an important liberty, but not an absolute
liberty).
42
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2415
(1995) (arguing that parent is better positioned than state to make child-rearing decisions on behalf of
child). Cf. Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 279, 284–90 (discussing parental rights cases and noting possible weakening state of parental rights
post-Troxel in Court’s suggestion that third-party visitation claims could succeed under certain
circumstances).
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nationality, residency, custody, visitation, and other social associations.
Remarkably, the story is much different in juvenile criminal and
delinquency proceedings, where the parent’s rights to make decisions for the
child are much more limited and less well defined. Here the child, not the
parent, is presumed to make her own decisions regarding the goals and
important strategies in her case. The child juvenile “defendant”43—like the
adult criminal defendant—consults with her lawyer to set the legal agenda,
decides whether to concede the allegations or go to trial, whether to testify
or not, and countless other decisions that arise during the course of the case.
There are other instances in the law where children are granted decisionmaking authority over their lives without regard to parental or governmental
interference (consider the abortion decision for example).44 Yet, a
comparison between these cases and the juvenile delinquency cases reveals
two important anomalies from the traditional framework of decision-making
authority.
The first anomaly is that the juvenile justice case does not obviously fit
the child/parent versus state or the child/state versus parent triadic
formulation of most juvenile cases. This anomaly is further complicated by
the necessarily active role of the child’s counsel in these cases, particularly
with younger minors. The lawyer arguably becomes a fourth party in some
cases, pressing forth her own views of the optimal outcome. The second
anomaly is that the traditional measures for parental disenfranchisement
used in other contexts—a declaration of parental unfitness, a finding of
maturity/competence of a minor, a state’s claim of parens patriae or police
power—are circumvented here. Typically, a parent’s decision-making
authority can be overcome if there is a showing that the child, though a
minor, is competent to make her own decisions or that the parent is
incompetent or unfit. In the instance of juvenile adjudications, the parent’s
advice is legally inconsequential even if it is in the best interest of the child.
A. Anomaly Number One: Defying the Triad
Cases involving the rights of children or of parents are commonly
described as “triadic” among family law scholars. The parent, the child, and
the state—each at opposing ends of a triangle—compete for the authority to
make important decisions on behalf of the child. The triads are a useful
concept in analyzing who has the presumptive right of decision making and
how the other two parties in the triad are involved in supporting or
challenging that right. There are three formulations of the triad, each giving
43
I use the term “defendant” here to stress the parallels between the adult and child proceedings
but the juvenile adjudication is not formally a criminal or adversarial proceeding.
44
See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 632 (1979) (holding that minor who is mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own must be authorized to act without
parental consent or notification).
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priority in decision making to the parent, the child, or the state.

State

Child

Parent

Parent

State

Child

Child

Parent

State

Triad 1 (top left); Triad 2 (top right);
h Triad 3 (bottom left)
Figure 1
In some instances—what I will call Triad One—the state’s presumptive
authority is challenged by a parent, generally but not necessarily, in
collaboration with the child. Residing in this category of cases might be a
parent who wants to homeschool her child in contravention of state
regulations that she deems onerous. The parent here argues that she has a
right as a parent to make educational decisions for her child. The state may
assert its own interest in protecting the child or ensuring a well-educated
citizenry.
In another iteration of Triad One, a child challenges state rules
permitting suspicionless searches in schools in an assertion of privacy rights.
These are cases in which the child and or the parent question the state’s
parens patriae authority over the child in some particular context.
In cases characteristic of Triad Two, the parent’s presumptive authority
is challenged by the child (often with the state’s help). Or the state (typically
on its own) rejects the parent’s commonly-accepted right to exert parental
will over the child. Examples of such cases include medical decision
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making, underage marriage, emancipation, and compulsory education. In
each of these, the state or child argues that the parent’s wishes are
inconsistent with the child’s best interest or other important public policy,
and the state is asked to relieve the child of the parent’s authority to control
the child.
The cases represented by the configuration in Triad Three are the most
unusual of all parent-child-state conflicts. These are the cases in which the
state and parents join forces against the child to further restrict the child’s
autonomy or rights. An example might be a case in which a minor runs away
from home and the parent seeks the intervention of the state to facilitate the
child’s return, or a case in which a parent seeks a court declaration that her
child is “in need of supervision.”
Although virtually all children’s and parent’s rights cases can be
categorized into one of the three triads, the juvenile justice proceeding—and
particularly the parent’s role in decision making—does not fit comfortably
into the traditional triad model. The juvenile defense lawyer’s role in the
case contributes in large part to the anomaly.
How might we consider the juvenile adjudication case under the triad
model? At first blush, these cases most resemble those in Triad One. When
the child faces a delinquency proceeding, the child is a party seeking to
preserve her own constitutional rights or decision-making authority. In Triad
One, the first category of cases, the child challenges state authority. Recall
here the challenge to a locker search under the Fourth Amendment. But this
view of a minor as an independent litigant asserting a constitutional right is
extraordinarily unrealistic. The notion that most minors can direct their own
affairs—particularly legal affairs—without adult facilitators is simply a
fiction that the law does not typically indulge. When the minor asserts a right
against the state, she usually does so with parental or other adult support.45
Many, though not all, of these cases occur in the school context.46 Although
these cases involve the rights of minors (as opposed to their parents), minors
typically need the help of a parent facilitator. The First Amendment case of
Tinker v. Des Moines47 illustrates the point. John Tinker and a group of other
students were prohibited from wearing armbands to school protesting the
Vietnam War.48 Twelve-year-old John Tinker, his younger sister, and a third
unrelated minor took the case to the Supreme Court. Famously stating that a
child’s “constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression [does not
end] at the schoolhouse gate,” the Court held that the school’s policy
45
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (providing an
example where a complaint was filed by the parents of the children who were prohibited from wearing
armbands to school protesting the Vietnam War).
46
See, e.g., id. (arising from school punishing students for wearing armbands to school protesting
the Vietnam War).
47
Id. at 503.
48
Id. at 504.
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violated the children’s rights under the First Amendment. Further
exploration into the facts of the Tinker case reveals, not surprisingly, that
John’s parents were activists and war protestors.50 While we could speculate
about the degree of parental influence or orchestration, there is no clear
evidence that they put him and his sister up to organizing the protest.
Nonetheless, it is unfathomable that John Tinker could have brought a case
to the United States Supreme Court without considerable assistance from a
parent or other adult.51 In an interview many years later, Tinker explained
that the other children “couldn’t participate in the suit because their parents
had issues with their work” and feared the political and social isolation.52
The Tinker case is not unusual. Children typically need adult help to defend
against state overreaching or abuse. Even adults themselves face tremendous
societal pressure based on the legal positions they are presumed to adopt
when they facilitate legal action on behalf of their children.
We might consider the child’s decision-making authority in juvenile
delinquency cases under Triad Two. But this triad does not quite fit the
situation either. This is the category of children’s rights cases in which the
child seeks to assert a liberty claim against the parent’s presumed right of
authority over the child. In these cases, the state or a third party often plays
the role of facilitator that the parents play in the first category of cases. For
example, a minor’s constitutional right to an abortion, without more, does
not overcome her parents’ rights to make decisions on her behalf. A minor
girl may not enter a family health clinic and make a decision to terminate
her pregnancy without parental consent; however, the minor can obtain an
abortion without the consent of her parents if a judge agrees that it is in her
best interest or finds that she is sufficiently mature to decide for herself.53

49

Id. at 506.
Joseph Russomanno, Dissent Yesterday and Today: The Tinker Case and Its Legacy, 11 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 367, 378–79 (2006).
51
John and Mary Beth Tinker would not have been able to litigate their case without the support of
their parents. One scholar reminds us the three minor plaintiffs in this case “were not the only students
who took part in the protests. But they are the only students whose parents were willing to take the risks
associated with filing legal claims.” Id. at 381.
52
According to John Tinker,
[t]he other kids that were kicked out of school didn’t have support from their parents.
Although they may have had moral support, they couldn’t participate in the suit
because their parents had issues with their own work. They believed it would harm
their chances to keep their job or get promoted. We were considered to be out on very
thin ice, politically and socially.
Id.
53
See, e.g., Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 649–50 (1979) (holding that a minor cannot be unduly
burdened by the absolute requirement of parental consent or notification but that a parental bypass
provision—in this case judicial consent—must be permitted).
50
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This is oftentimes also true, for example, of the minor who refuses
medical treatment against her parent’s wishes,54 seeks contraception for
premarital (and, under many statutory rape statutes, per se nonconsensual)
sex,55 or wants to control her own assets. In these sorts of cases, the avenues
for circumventing parental decision-making rights exist but are closely
regulated.56
Triad Three does not seem to apply to the juvenile context either. One
argument might be that the state and parent team up to discipline the child,
but this bears little semblance to reality.
The juvenile justice context defies easy sorting into the conventional
formula of rights competitions of child/parent-versus-state or child/state
versus-parent. A legal contest between the state and the child that could
result in a loss of liberty for the child is similar to the instances in which the
child attempts (with parental help) to challenge the state’s power (Triad
One). On the other hand, the notion that a child could direct her own legal
case (with the assistance of state-appointed counsel) to effectuate her own
desired outcome without regard for her parent’s desires presents a classic
challenge to parental authority (Triad Two). The child’s ability to exercise
the rights guaranteed to all persons accused of crimes without intrusion from
a third party is neither child/parent versus state nor child/state versus parent.
Neither of the potential triads quite fit.
B. Anomaly Number Two: Maturity and Best Interest Findings
An examination of the parent’s role in the juvenile justice case reveals a
second important anomaly. Here, parental rights are undermined even when
there is reason to suspect that the parent is a particularly bad decision maker,
or that the child is a particularly good one. Parental rights can be overridden
when a child has been adjudicated a mature minor, a parent has been legally
declared unfit, or a judicial determination is made that the state’s parens
patriae or police power supersedes the parent’s substantive due process
54

See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (explaining that a state is not without
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental
health is jeopardized).
55
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 104 (1976); Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431
US 678, 692–93 (1977) (recognizing minors’ rights to contraception).
56
The norms against bypassing parental authority are strong. For instance, in its reluctance to apply
the mature minor doctrine, the Supreme Court concluded in Parham v. J.R., that “[m]ost children, even
in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions . . . . Parents
can and must make those judgments.” 442 U.S. at 603. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the
decisions of fit parents are “presumed to be in the best interest of the child.” Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 90 (2000). When the minor lacks the competence or maturity to decide for herself, the state must
determine whether a choice contrary to the parent’s choice is in the child’s best interest. Id. Children
need the assistance or approval of the state to overcome the dominant notion that the parent’s decisions
should govern. Id. This is the case in nearly every legal context with the exception of juvenile justice.
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rights. In these instances, the allocation of decision-making authority is
determined by examining the relative ability of the decision maker. The
exclusion of parents in juvenile delinquency decision making does not
comport with this model. The doctrinal rationale for limiting parental
involvement has nothing to do with the parent’s history of making poor
decisions and a great deal to do with other considerations.
Similarly, the child is presumed to control the case not because she has
been found to be particularly mature or wise, but for entirely separate
reasons.
Consider first the application of the “mature minor” doctrine in other
parent-child-state conflicts. The developmental limitations of minors,
including older adolescents, are by now well documented57 and are often
used to support claims of incompetence in decision-making cases. Still, there
are exceptions. In some situations, a court can make a judicial determination
that a particular minor is sufficiently mature to make competent decisions.
Absent a finding of maturity, the parent is authorized to decide for the
child.58 For children who are charged with wrongdoing, there is no procedure
in criminal or juvenile justice that seeks to resolve the “mature minor”
question before a child, rather than her guardian, is permitted to make legal
decisions on her own behalf. Children can make a series of legally-binding
and life-altering choices. They can, for instance, consent to searches, make
statements to law enforcement, enter pleas and admissions, agree to assist
the authorities in perilous situations—all without parental input and without
a judicial finding of maturity.
Being declared mature is not the only way to circumvent the parental
right to direct the child’s conduct. There are cases outside the criminal
context in which the child lacks the maturity to bypass parental decision
making but other justifications exist to reject or forego parental input. In
those instances, a state actor is permitted to decide for the child but the state
decision-maker is typically required to elect an outcome that is in the best
interest of the child. This is in part because the state is said then to be acting
in loco parentis, or in the place of the parent, and is required to decide based
on the standard that all fit parents are presumed to use.
In the juvenile criminal case, while it may be true that parents are
perceived as having failed in childrearing duties, there is no explicit or
implicit assumption by juvenile courts that the parent is unfit or disqualified

57
Buss, supra note 37, at 41. See also Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental
Incompetence, Due Process and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C.L. REV. 793, 811–17 (2005) (discussing
four spheres of development that impact decision-making capacity in minors).
58
See, e.g., Belotti, 443 U.S. at 632 (holding that minor who is mature and well enough informed
to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own must be authorized to act without parental consent
or notification).
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to parent. The standard for unfitness is, and ought to be, extremely high,59 as
a determination of unfitness is the key determinant in the termination of
parental rights. A parent is not deemed unfit merely because she has made a
decision with which reasonable people might disagree or with which the
state differs. Even a determination of abuse or neglect does not create a
presumption of unfitness.60 Parents are presumed to act in the best interest
of their children and so if a parent is deemed unfit or unable to make bestinterest determinations for the child for some other reason—as in the case of
parental incapacity or legal conflict of interest—the state can provide the
child with a guardian ad litem.
A guardian ad litem (GAL) serves this role in some juvenile court cases.
Judicial intervention is generally required before a state actor or guardian is
assigned the role of helping the accused minor make legal decisions during
the course of the representation that are in the child’s best interest. A
guardian can be assigned at the behest of the attorney. The child’s attorney
can notify the court that her client lacks the capacity to assist in her defense.
Alternatively, the court can consider the question of capacity on its own
motion. In such cases, the court could appoint a guardian for the child.
Interestingly, the appointment of a GAL does not occur as a matter of course
in juvenile cases even though all juvenile cases involve minors by definition.
Only a tiny fraction of juvenile justice cases involve the appointment of a
GAL.61
The exclusion of parents from making decisions about their children in
the juvenile case is not premised on the maturity of the minors. These cases,
unlike others in the juvenile law area require no finding of maturity before a
child is able to make decisions without regard to her parents’ wishes or
instructions. Nor is this system based on the implied unfitness of parents in
these cases. Indeed, parents are given limited rights of notice and minimal
participation in most states. Their opinions are regularly, if informally,
sought by judges and their involvement is often required for temporary
release, probation, or court supervision. Finally, no other adult is
systematically appointed to replace the parent’s decision-making role or to
assist the court or defense attorney in making choices consistent with the
best interest of the child.
59

See Emily Buss, Parental Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 678 (2002) (deducing that the Supreme
Court ruling in Santosky v. Kramer “endorsed a high, unfitness-based standard”); see also Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972).
60
Justine A. Dunlap, Book Review, A Review of What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights: Still a
Slogan in Search of a Definition, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 181, 191 (2007) (describing the
vagueness of the unfitness test generally and contrasting it with the neglect determination).
61
Even with cases involving guardians ad litem, there is great uncertainty regarding the appropriate
role of the GAL and to whom—the court or the child— the GAL owes her allegiance. See Margaret E.
Sjostrom, What’s a GAL to Do? The Proper Role of Guardians Ad Litem in Disputed Custody and
Visitation Proceedings, 24 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 2, 3–5 (2004).
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C. Reimagining the Triad: Juvenile Cases and the Parents’ Role
The assumption that the child will be in charge of her case is in many
cases a convenient fiction. Yet parents have been excluded from exercising
authority in these cases. To understand the diminished role of parents, one
must first understand the role of a lawyer, the adult presumed to help the
child. Indeed, the attorney’s prominent role in the juvenile justice case and
the relatively minor role for parents raise profound questions about the
application of the triadic model.
The conventional wisdom today—and indeed, the position mandated by
some state statutes and urged by the American Bar Association and the
Institute of Judicial Administration62—strongly rejects the contention that
juvenile defense attorneys apply the best-interest standard in representing
juveniles. Lawyers are urged to treat their child clients’ instructions just as
they would treat the directives of adult criminal defendants, even when the
lawyers believe that the outcome would not be in the child’s best interest.
As the argument goes, any other representational model would equate
replacing the child’s stated interests with the attorney’s personal opinion of
the child’s interests.63 While practitioners accept this interpretation of
children’s formal authority, the reality is that children are highly malleable
clients. In other words, although all criminal defendants have the right to
determine their own legal interests and the goals of their representation,
attorneys play a crucial role in shaping their minor clients’ stated interests.
As one scholar put it, "It is also fair to assume that few children fully
understand their right to assert a directive role in the attorney-client
relationship. Even when there is no confusion regarding the attorney's
loyalty, children are generally socialized to expect adults to make decisions
for them and may defer to the lawyer by default."64 In many cases, the lawyer
is an active player in setting the goals of the representation in juvenile cases
and is not merely a passive agent of the minor client. This active role makes
the lawyer more than a mere agent of the child client. It adds a new angle to
the case and warrants perhaps the addition of a fourth side to the traditional
triad, turning it into a quadrangle.
Alternatively, we could retain the triad formulation and imagine that
lawyer replaces the parent in the triad. In making decisions about the child’s
62

See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role
of the Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 255–59 (2005) (discussing
joint standards by the ABA and IJA requiring the attorney to respect the client’s determination of her
own interests); see also Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View
of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 334–36 (2003); Robert
E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, I Know the Child is My Client, But Who Am I?, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1917, 1935–40 (1996) (further explaining the various standards applicable to the GAL).
63
Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV. 76, 79–80 (1984).
64
Henning, supra note 62, at 273.
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case, the parent currently has no legally recognized role. The parent is
involved only to the extent that the juvenile and her lawyer permit. In
actuality, either the parent would partner with the child in working with the
lawyer, or the parent would partner with the lawyer in advancing the
representation of the child. Either way, the parent’s participation is
determined by others and does not occur as a matter of right, constitutional
or otherwise. The displacement of the parent by the lawyer was perhaps not
envisioned by the Gault court, but it exists nonetheless.
The problem arises because, in the words of family law scholar Martin
Guggenheim, “[t]he immutable truth of childrearing is that someone has to
be in charge.”65 Frequently, the only state actor feasibly positioned to make
a best-interest determination on behalf of the minor is the minor’s attorney.
How can the lawyer’s participation transform the direction of the case? The
lawyer comes to the representation with a distinct perspective and the power
to help implement it. Despite good intentions, the child’s counsel can
subordinate her client’s specific wishes to the lawyers’ own notions of what
is good for the child.66 These defense lawyers enter the case with their own
worldviews of what is in the best interest of a child. As defense lawyers, they
have particular biases and motives shaped by their training and profession.67
These lawyers view themselves as part of the criminal defense bar rather
than the children’s bar and tend to view their goals in terms of protecting
liberty interests of their clients. That is, they want mostly to “get the client
off.” In addition to their defense-attorney orientation, attorneys in juvenile
cases have the characteristics of most lawyers. Lawyers generally tend to be
more focused on legal rights and evidence than their lay clients.68 They are
selected and trained to be more analytical and prone to
compartmentalizing.69 Lawyers in these cases will have greater difficulty
following “a best-interest standard” outcome that competes with their
defense- and rights-oriented training. Even if the child client or parent seeks
a “best-interest” outcome, many lawyers—with the best intentions—
interpret this as a “liberty-maximizing” outcome. Essentially, lawyers have
their own professionally-driven agendas.

65

MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 42 (2005).
Annette R. Appell, Children’s Voice and Justice: Lawyering for Children in the Twenty-First
Century, 6 NEV. L.J. 692, 722 (2006). See also Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment:
Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1655, 1656 (1996) (describing the grave imbalance of power between attorney and minor client).
67
See Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1201–03 (2005) (discussing
empirical study on motivations and self-perceptions of criminal defense lawyers).
68
See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1337, 1411–12 (1997).
69
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 87 (1997).
66
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***
The limitations and safeguards on child decision-making autonomy that
are well rehearsed in other legal contexts are not brought to bear in the areas
of juvenile and criminal law. But for the lawyer’s possible intervention, the
child rises or falls on her own in making decisions about the handling of her
case. The conventional rule that parents have a constitutional right to make
decisions of import for their minor children (absent a showing of unfitness,
conflict with the child’s ability to exercise her constitutional rights, or a
strong countervailing policy reason) appears to go unheeded.
Several hypotheses might explain why we disallow parental intrusion
into the life-altering decisions of their children, though there are apparent
anomalies. Greater judicial oversight over juvenile cases leads us to worry
less about reduced parental oversight. Our commitment to providing rights
to the accused adult leads us to an exaggerated conception of individual
autonomy for the accused minor. Society is unconcerned with juveniles
charged with crimes and uninterested in helping them acquire more adult
strategies to “game” the system. Parents of juvenile delinquents are either
undeserving of the broad rights over their children’s upbringing or are
estopped from now trying to exert control over their children’s lives. But if
one or more of these hypotheses is correct, the cases have so far not said so
explicitly. In the end, none of these possible explanations suffices to explain
the nearly wholesale disregard for the legal rights of parents in these cases.
The law’s disregard in this context raises several important questions.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the fact that parental decision making is
not legally protected in these cases does not mean that parental participation
does not occur. To the contrary, there is much evidence that parents “remain
integrally involved”70 and play a significant informal role in advising and
guiding their minor children in criminal and delinquency cases.71 But how
do parents participate and under what circumstances? How and why do
lawyers, given their positions of trust and power in orchestrating case-related
decisions,72 exert influence over the parental decision-making and
childrearing role? Should parents be permitted a more formal role—as in
other contexts—absent a finding of parental unfitness or a determination of
maturity on the part of the minor?
Many of the questions are empirical and must be left for another day.
Understanding how parents engage in their children’s cases and how parents
and lawyers interact are important empirical considerations that will
contribute toward discerning the optimal parental role under the law. That
is, how should the law go about determining the optimal level of
70

Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer To Raise a Child?: Allocating Responsibilities Among
Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 NEV. L.J. 836, 837 (2006).
71
Id.
72
See Federle, supra note 65, at 1693 (discussing the power of attorneys and the powerlessness of
clients and the impact on the lawyering relationship).

82

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

participation for parents in juvenile criminal proceedings? One way to get at
the normative question is to consider what we know now about the impact
of parental inclusion and exclusion in the instances where they occur today.
III. ASSESSING EXISTING CASES OF PARENTAL EXCLUSION AND
INCLUSION
Underlying much of the attorney conduct described in this study is the
contention that some parental involvement and decision making—even
when parents are fit in other contexts—can endanger their children’s legal
cases. First, I consider whether the attorneys’ stated concerns about the
potential hazards of parental decision making in some cases are exaggerated.
I explore the merits of their claims in part by examining two paradigmatic
examples of parental inclusion and exclusion.
A. A Case of Parental Inclusion: Parents in the Interrogation Room
Parents do not a have a constitutional right to be present during the
police interrogation of their children. However, states have taken varying
approaches to the inclusion of parents in the interrogation room and this
variation has created a natural experiment. In some states, law enforcement
can refuse a child’s request to have a parent present.73 In some states, a
child’s request for a parent’s presence must be honored before questioning
can occur,74 whereas in other states, a parent is permitted to make the request
to confer with a child.75 Finally, there are several states in which a child may
waive the right against self-incrimination, but must do so in the presence of
a parent or other interested adult.76 Most states are silent regarding the role
of parents in interrogations, and thus leave it up to local law enforcement
policy or individual officers.

73
See, e.g., In re Doe, 978 P.2d 684, 686 (Haw. 1999) (“[T]he plain language of HRS § 571–31(b)
requires neither an opportunity for parent-child communication prior to police interrogation nor parental
presence during the custodial questioning of a minor.”); Moore v. State, 30 A.3d 945, 952, 954 (Md.
2011) (recognizing that the denial of parental access to a juvenile charged as an adult is only an important
factor in assessing voluntariness).
74
See, e.g., In re Gregory S., 112 Cal. App. 3d 764, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (“Custodial
interrogation of a minor is improper following his unhonored request to see his parents.”) (citation
omitted). See also N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 305.2(3)–(4) (McKinney 2017) (requiring that a reasonable
effort be made to locate parents or guardians).
75
See, e.g., M.A.C. v. Harrison County Family Ct., 566 So. 2d 472 (Miss. 1990) (holding law
enforcement officials’ refusal to allow juvenile’s mother to be present during interrogation violated state
statute). See also People v. Griffin, 763 N.E.2d 880, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding the minordefendant’s parents had a valid interest in wishing to confer with their child before questioning that
strongly weighed against a finding that defendant’s statement was voluntary).
76
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-137; COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1); IND. CODE § 31-325-1; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26(1).
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Miranda v. Arizona, and its mandates regarding safeguards to protect
the Sixth and Fifth Amendments,77 has raised many questions regarding the
rights of the juvenile in the interrogation room. Miranda requires quite
clearly that interrogation ceases when a custodial suspect asks for the
assistance of counsel. But what happens when a minor, perhaps feeling
pressured, uncomfortable, or even coerced, asks for the assistance of a
trusted adult without specifically invoking the right to counsel? In Fare v.
Michael C., the Supreme Court provided some insight on the constitutional
weight to be given a child’s request for help in the interrogation room.78 In
that case, the juvenile, asked the police to speak to his probation officer and
his request was denied. The petitioner argued that the statements obtained
from him thereafter were done so unconstitutionally. The Court ruled that a
minor’s ignored request for his probation officer during interrogation did not
violate the minor’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.79 Fare held that the
voluntariness of juvenile confessions should be evaluated under a “totality
of the circumstances” test rather than any special rule for juveniles.80 The
Court did not address the question of whether a minor is entitled to speak
with a parent or other adult before being interrogated. In light of Fare, it is
dubious that the child is entitled to parental assistance or a parent is entitled
to assist her child during questioning. Of course, Fare created no
constitutional impediment to a parent’s presence or participation either.
Accordingly, the decision led to a flurry of criticism and proposals for
reform at the state level. The most far-reaching proposals would require
either that attorneys be provided automatically to minors prior to police
questioning or, as was argued in Fare, that a minor’s request for adult
assistance be construed by law enforcement as the equivalent of a Miranda
request for an attorney. The vast majority of states follow Fare in that a
juvenile’s waiver of rights is assessed just like an adult’s waiver—based on
the totality of the circumstances.81 Age and experience are merely among
the many factors considered under that test.82
Rule
State
Officer must grant juvenile’s request to AL, AR, CA, FL
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465–66 (1965).
442 U.S. 707, 709 (1978).
79
Id. at 719–22.
80
Id. at 725.
81
Kimberly Larson, Improving the “Kangaroo Courts”: A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating
Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV., 629, 645–46 (2003) (detailing the states that apply Fare
and the totality of the circumstances test).
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Id. at 646.
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speak with parent83
Officer must grant parent’s request to
speak with child84
Officer is not required to grant parent or
child’s request to confer85
Parent is required for juvenile to waive
rights; “Interested-adult” rule86
Totality of circumstances test to
determine if valid waiver of juvenile
rights87

MS
HI, OR, IL
CO, CT, IN, ND, OK, PA, VT
AZ, GA, LA, MD, MI, MN,
MO, NV, NH, NY, OH, RI, SC,
SD, TN, UT, VA, WV, WI

A juvenile may voluntarily waive her AK, DE, ME, TX
rights without parental presence88

83

ARK. CODE § 9-27-317; Carr v. State, 545 So. 2d 820, 822 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); In re Anthony
J., 107 Cal. App. 3d 962, 973 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
84
MISS. CODE § 43-21-151 (1972); see also Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 787, 804 (Miss. 2007)
(finding mother’s removal from the interrogation violated the Youth Court Act).
85
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-31; In re Doe, 978 P.2d 684, 686 (Haw. 1999); State ex rel. Juvenile
Dep’t of Lane Cty. v. Gibson, 718 P.2d 759, 765 (Or. App. 1986); see also People v. Pogue, 724 N.E.2d
525, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“[A] juvenile has no per se right to have a parent present during questioning,
or to consult with one prior to questioning . . . . Thus, the absence of a parent is one factor to consider,
but is not, itself, determinative of whether the juvenile's confession should be suppressed.” (citations
omitted)), appeal denied, 744 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2001).
86
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-137; IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1(2); Grant v. People, 48 P.3d 543, 550
(Colo. 2002); In re Kevin K., 7 A.3d 898, 906 (Conn. 2010); Ex rel. B.S., 496 N.W.2d 31, 33 (N.D.
1993); J.D.L., Jr. v. State, 782 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Com. v. Williams, 475 A.2d
1283, 1285 (Pa. 1984); In re E. T. C., 449 A.2d 937, 939 (Vt. 1982).
87
State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 592–93 (Minn. 2005); In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 164
(Wis. 2005); In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555 (Ariz. 2004); State v. Jones, 607 S.E.2d 498, 504–05 (W.
Va. 2004); In re Joseph B., 822 A.2d 172, 174 (R.I. 2003); State v. Rodriguez, 559 S.E.2d 435, 437 (Ga.
2002); People v. Hall, 643 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Horse, 644 N.W.2d 211
(S.D. 2002); State v. Farrell, 766 A.2d 1057, 1061 (N.H. 2001); In re Goins, 738 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1999); State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 487 (La. 1998); In re Phillip J., 683 N.Y.S.2d 293,
295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 427 (Utah 1998); State v. Barnaby, 950
S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Grogg v. Commonwealth, 371 S.E.2d 549, 556 (Va. Ct. App. 1988);
McIntyre v. State, 526 A.2d 30, 37 (Md. 1987); Quiriconi v. State, 616 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Nev. 1980); In
re Williams, 217 S.E.2d 719, 722 (S.C. 1975); Braziel v. State, 529 S.W.2d 501, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1975).
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State v. Jones, 55 A.3d 432, 438 n.2 (Me. 2012); Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144, 1150 (Del.
2007); Conner v. State, 982 S.W.2d 655, 659 (Ark. 1998); In re E.M.R., 55 S.W.3d 712, 726 (Tex. App.
2001).
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Child under certain age cannot waive IA (16 years), KS (14 years),
rights without consent of parent or MA (14 years), MT (16 years),
guardian89
NJ (14 years), NC (14 years),
NM (13 years), WA (12 years)
No relevant statute or case law identified ID, KY, NE, WY

While most states apply Fare, a handful of states require authorities to
allow children to speak to their parents or require an interested adult to be
present before the juvenile is permitted to waive Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. These states provide a natural experiment on the impact of parental
inclusion in the juvenile justice process. From the perspective of the legal
welfare of juveniles, this experiment has gone terribly wrong.
The most recent research findings on this subject echo the view that
parents are generally lousy at protecting the rights of their children in the
interrogation room. 90 Most parents encourage their children to confess, and
indeed can be just as coercive, if not more so, than the law enforcement
officers.91 Parents, of course, are not state actors under most circumstances,
which makes it harder for attorneys to challenge the coercive practices used
by parents even when the parents are clearly brought in to assist the police.
Many parents are easily duped into believing that confession is in their
child’s best interest legally. Convincing the suspect (and/or her parents) that
a full confession is the best course of action and will result in a lenient
outcome is an important law enforcement strategy.92 If law enforcement can
persuade parents of this, they can then enlist parents in persuading their
children. Children in turn are more likely to believe their parents than the
police.93
Moreover, some parents likely believe that confession is in the best
interest of the child from a moral standpoint. Good parents, after all, are
89

See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 232.11; MONT. CODE § 41-5-331(2)(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2101;
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.140; State v. DeAngelo M., 344 P.3d 1019, 1025 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d
on other grounds, 360 P.3d 1151 (N.M. 2015); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1115 (N.J. 2000); In re
B.M.B, 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998); Commonwealth v. MacNeill, 502 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Mass.
1987).
90
See Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations:
Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1291–98 (2004) (describing many ways in which a parent’s
presence in the interrogation room often hurts juveniles).
91
See id. at 1289; see also Jonathan Eig, Making Them Talk, CHI. MAG., Jan. 1, 1999, at 50.
92
Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development
and Policy Interrogation, 31 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 66 (2007).
93
See Jamie L. Flexon et al., Exploring the Dimensions of Trust in the Police Among Chicago
Juveniles, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 180 (2009) (“Historically, research has shown that younger members of the
community are less likely to trust and cooperate with police officers than older members of the
community.” (citation omitted)).
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making parenting decisions and may seize the interrogation process as a
“teaching moment” in which to instruct minors about the difference between
right and wrong, the importance of honesty, and taking responsibility for
one’s actions. As a childrearing moment, some parents encourage their
children to talk to police because “they’re teaching their children to respect
authority or take responsibility.”94 These are indeed important lessons and
are nearly impossible to distinguish from a parent’s rights to raise and
discipline her child or the right to provide religious instruction. Yet parents
may not understand the full implications of confessions.
Then there is the worrisome case of the parent who has a conflict of
interest. The parent may be involved in the wrongdoing or seeking to protect
someone else who is, for instance a co-conspirator or another child. Parents
may face lawsuits or be at risk of losing state or federal benefits—such as
housing, student loans, or immigration status—based on the conduct of their
children.95 This could influence the parental advice in either direction with
a reduced interest on what is strictly in the child’s legal interest.
Beyond all this, parents who have participated in the interrogation
process may have difficulty limiting their involvement to just that process.
They frequently become unwitting witnesses against their children. Even the
parent who did not encourage her child to waive her constitutional rights,
later serves to buttress the prosecution’s argument of voluntariness.
Consider how parents might be questioned by the state regarding the
procedures they witnessed during interrogation: Did we read your child his
or her Miranda warnings? Did anyone threaten or coerce or make promises
to your child? You certainly would not have stood by and watched as we
mistreated your child, would you? And so forth. Law enforcement officers
and prosecutors could take advantage of parental presence in these
circumstances.
There is a strong argument that parent’s presence in the interrogation is
more harmful than it is helpful to the juvenile’s legal case.96 Except for those
cases in which there is potential for physical or strong psychological
coercion, the parent’s role in the interrogation process does not necessarily
lead to a better legal result. It is unclear if the parental presence is helpful to
the child in non-legal ways. Of course, the interrogation process is
frightening and stressful. It is particularly so for minors. It may be that the
94
THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE
167 (1981).
95
Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called “Out” at Home: The One Strike Eviction Policy and
Juvenile Court, 3 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 113–15 (2011); see also Kim Bellware, They’ve Lived
Their Lives As Americans, But They Can Still Be Deported, HUFF. POST (Oct. 27, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/adopted-children-deportation-adam-crapser_us_
566a0cd9e4b080eddf57b949 (“Foreign-born adoptees who have green cards can work, are eligible for a
driver’s license and even qualify for Social Security benefits and student loans. Unlike citizens, they can
be deported, even for nonviolent misdeeds.”).
96
See generally Farber, supra note 90.
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parent’s presence is comforting for the child, and perhaps it is in the child’s
best interest holistically, but the evidence that it is in the child’s best legal
interest is quite slim.
B. A Case of Parental Exclusion
An ongoing debate among legal scholars who study and analyze
questions of juvenile representation concerns the extension of the attorneyclient privilege to parents. The limited rule, as it currently exists, excludes
parents from participating in privileged conversations with clients except
under very limited circumstances.97 Attorneys are required to advise their
minor clients against discussing their cases with their parents or anyone
else—thereby creating a potential wedge within the family or the parentchild relationship.
Although forty-five states and the federal government do not recognize
a parent-child testimonial privilege, many scholars have long argued in favor
of such a privilege.98 Nonetheless, it seems that such an expansion could
make the juvenile lawyer’s jobs harder rather than easier. First, the existing
rules provide cover for lawyers and their older teen clients to have honest
discussions without the presence of the parent. One might imagine that teens
would be reluctant to admit embarrassing facts to their parents, especially in
sexual assault or violent cases. In those cases, attorneys could rely on the
formalistic rule restricting privileged communications. The parents were
told that they had to be kept in the dark in order to protect their child’s legal
case. Without such a rule, parents might be less willing to accept their
exclusion (especially if they were paying the attorney’s fees) and children
might be less open with their attorneys about important facts.
But what about the argument that, absent a broader privilege, parents
open themselves to having to testify against their children’s interests? The
reality is that there are few recorded instances in which parents are asked to
testify against her child on a substantive factual matter.99 Many recall the
outrage over Independent Counsel Kenneth Star’s decision to subpoena
Monica Lewinsky’s mother to testify regarding their mother-daughter
communications.100 The criticism of seeing “a mother being hauled” to court
97

Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privileges: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Concept,
28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 598–99 (1987).
98
See generally Hillary B. Farber, Do You Swear to Tell the Trust, the Whole Truth, and Nothing
But the Truth Against Your Child?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551 (2010); J. Tyson Covey, Making Form
Follow Function: Considerations in Creating and Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U.
ILL. L. REV. 879 (1991).
99
See Farber, supra note 98, at 555–56 (noting factors that might contribute to the scarcity of cases
in which parents are subpoenaed by the opposing party to testify against minor children).
100
144 CONG. REC. S803 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1998) (citing statement of Sen. Leahy: “One of the
most disturbing spectacles we have seen from Mr. Starr's inquest is that of a mother being hauled before
a grand jury to reveal her intimate conversations with her own daughter.”).
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“to reveal her intimated conversations with her own daughter” were
shocking in part because such a strategy is so infrequently exercised. Why?
Prosecutors may be reluctant to subpoena parent witnesses who are likely to
be hostile and uncontrollable on the stand. In other words, the fear about not
having the privilege is likely not as realistic as many might suppose because
there are very good reasons the state might not seek the forced testimony of
a parent.
Finally, it is likely that in some cases, parents are needed to facilitate the
attorney-child conversation. For very young or otherwise incompetent
clients, most states have evidence rules that would allow for an “interpreter”
or guardian to assist in difficult communications. These assistants are then
covered under the attorney-client privilege.102 However, far more common
than this application of the evidentiary exception is that many attorneys
appeared willing to ignore the lack of privilege in instances where they
believed doing so was best for the case. Attorneys might let a parent stay in
the room if the child requested it, precisely because the attorneys had little
reason to believe from experience that prosecutors would discover or act
upon the unprivileged communication. In this instance, the parentalexclusion rule created a default position that attorneys either abided or
ignored, based on their own judgment of the inherent risks for their clients.
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
It is widely accepted, and Courts have consistently held, that parents are
presumed to act in the best interest of their children. The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to guarantee to parents
the right to make decisions for their children, unless a judge or legal
authority finds the parent to be unfit or there is a strong countervailing public
policy concern. In the juvenile justice context, as a result of the procedural
safeguards heralded by Gault and the post-Gault cases, the traditional
parental role was nearly eliminated. The parties engaged in the traditional
adversarial triad of children-related cases are no longer parent-child-state,
but rather lawyer-child-state. The person best positioned to make and
facilitate legal decisions with the juvenile may not be the child’s guardian at
all, but rather the child’s lawyer. The case law presents a telling story of how
the lawyer and parent compete for decision-making authority in the child’s
case in those instances in which there is disagreement regarding strategy and
outcome. In addition, research studies reveal, from the attorney’s
perspective, the very high legal stakes involved when parents make
improvident legal decisions.
The two examples discussed—allowing parents to assist in the
101
102

Id.
Robert L. Maxwell, The Parent-Child Privilege, 1984 BYU L. REV. 599, 609–13 (1984).
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interrogation room and allowing parents to participate in otherwise
privileged conversations—buttress the claims that parental inclusion and
exclusion can have serious ramifications on the child’s legal case. But the
binary choice between parental inclusion and exclusion is perhaps too
simplistic a framework from which to consider the question of the parents’
role. The question is not simply whether parents should be included or
excluded, but rather who is best positioned to make that determination and
under what circumstances would inclusion be preferable to exclusion.
Juvenile defense attorneys currently make this determination, but do so
guided by the norms of the criminal defense profession, not by the desire to
address normative and legal claims of parental prerogative or the child’s best
interest.

